The Costs and Benefits of Additional Information in Agency Models with Endogenous Information Structures

We study the effect of additional private information in an agency model with an endogenous information structure. If more private information becomes available to the agent, this may hurt the agent, benefit the principal, and affect the total surplus ambiguously.

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Year of publication:	2009-06
Authors:	Hoppe, Eva I ; Schmitz, Patrick W
Institutions:	C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers
Subject:	adverse selection \| Hidden information \| information gathering

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	CEPR Discussion Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	Number 7331
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; D86 - Economics of Contract: Theory
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005036239