The Costs and Benefits of Additional Information in Agency Models with Endogenous Information Structures

We study the effect of additional private information in an agency model with an endogenous information structure. If more private information becomes available to the agent, this may hurt the agent, benefit the principal, and affect the total surplus ambiguously

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Year of publication:	2009
Authors:	Hoppe, Eva I.
Other Persons:	Schmitz, Patrick W. (contributor)
Publisher:	[2009]: [S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie \| Agency theory \| Informationswert \| Information value \| Informationsversorgung \| Information provision \| Adverse Selektion \| Adverse selection \| Theorie \| Theory

Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (13 p)
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments June 13, 2009 erstellt
Other identifiers:	10.2139/ssrn.1418997 [DOI]
Classification:	D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; D86 - Economics of Contract: Theory ; C72 - Noncooperative Games
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013158937