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The costs and benefits of symmetry in common-ownership allocation problems.

In experimental partnership dissolution problems with complete information, the divide-and-choose mechanism is significantly superior to the winner's-bid-auction. The performance of divide-and-choose is mainly affected by reciprocity issues and not by bounded rationality. The performance of the winner's-bid-auction is significantly affected by bounded rationality. Contrary to theoretical predicitions divide-and-choose exhibits no first-mover bias.
Year of publication:
2014-09-18
Authors: Brown, Alexander L. ; Velez, Rodrigo A.
Institutions: Department of Economics, Texas A&M University
Subject: experimental economics | no-envy | divide-and-choose | winner's-bid auction | behavioral mechanism design
Extent:
application/pdf
Series:
Type of publication: Book / Working Paper
Notes:
Number 20141106-10001 30 pages
Classification: C91 - Laboratory, Individual Behavior ; D63 - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement ; C72 - Noncooperative Games
Source:
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011272566
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