The Deegan-Packel Index for Simple Games with a Priori Unions
Year of publication: |
2008
|
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Authors: | Holler, Manfred J. ; Alonso-Meijide, José M. ; Casas-Mendez, Balbina ; Fiestras-Janeiro, G. |
Publisher: |
[S.l.] : SSRN |
Subject: | Kooperatives Spiel | Cooperative game | Abstimmungsspiel | Voting game | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Parlament | Parliament | Koalition | Coalition |
Description of contents: |
In this paper we define and axiomatically characterize an extension of the Deegan-Packel index for simple games with a priori unions. A real world example illustrates this extension
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