The Effect of Changes in Wage Orientation and Bargaining Power on Union Wages and Profits

This note uses a simple, Nash-bargaining model between a union and a firm to analyze the effect on wages and profits of a simultaneous change in the union's relative preference for wages over employment, and in its bargaining power. It is shown that, if there is efficient bargaining, a rise in the union's wage orientation combined with a fall in power can lead to an increase in both wages and profits.

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Year of publication:	1996-03
Authors:	Sanfey, Peter J.
Institutions:	School of Economics, University of Kent
Subject:	Trade Unions \| Bargaining Power

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Series:	Studies in Economics. - ISSN 1466-0814.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Classification:	J51 - Trade Unions: Objectives Structure, and Effects
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005635132