The Effect of Consumer Green Preference on Green Technology Choice Decisions

This paper focuses on a competing supply chain with two manufacturers to utilize both a manufacturer-led Stackelberg game and horizontal Nash game for studying the green technology choice decisions under consumer green preference. The results indicate that: (1) Given that the two manufacturers hold the same game power in making the technology choice and price decisions, both manufacturers will always employ the ordinary technologies in the weak green preference of consumer and the green technologies in the strong green preference of consumer. But, given that they possess imbalanced game power in making price decisions, only the follower will utilize the green technology in the weak green preference of consumer, while both will play the role of the green technology in the strong green preference of consumer. (2) Given that the two manufacturers possess imbalanced technology selection powers, the conclusion is the same as that in result (1). If the two manufacturers declare the price at the same time, they will be free to employ the ordinary or the green technologies in the mild green preference of consumer. Our research also suggests that in order to protect the environment, policymakers should improve consumers' green preferences as much as possible, regardless of the market leadership between enterprises, so as to guide enterprises to employ more environmentally friendly technologies and improve their profits