The effect of franchise no-poaching restrictions on worker earnings

Brian Callaci, Matthew Gibson, Sérgio Pinto, Marshall Steinbaum, Matt Walsh

We evaluate the impact of the Washington State Attorney General's enforcement campaign against employee no-poaching clauses in franchising contracts, which unfolded from 2018 through early 2020. Implementing a staggered difference-in-differences research design using Burning Glass Technologies job vacancies and Glassdoor salary reports, we document the nationwide effect of the enforcement campaign on pay at franchising chains across numerous industries. Our preferred specification estimates a 6.6% increase in posted annual earnings from the job vacancy data and an approximate 4% increase in worker-reported earnings.

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Year of publication:	July 2023
Authors:	Callaci, Brian ; Gibson, Matthew ; Pinto, Sérgio ; Steinbaum, Marshall ; Walsh, Matt
Publisher:	Bonn, Germany : IZA - Institute of Labor Economics
Subject:	employer market power \| franchising \| antitrust \| oligopsony \| Franchising \| Marktmacht \| Market power \| Arbeitsmarkt \| Labour market \| Oligopol \| Oligopoly \| Kartellrecht \| Antitrust law \| Wettbewerbspolitik \| Competition policy \| Lohn \| Wages