The effect of franchise no-poaching restrictions on worker earnings

Brian Callaci, Matthew Gibson, Sérgio Pinto, Marshall Steinbaum, Matt Walsh

We evaluate the nationwide impact of the Washington State attorney general's 2018-2020 enforcement campaign against no-poach clauses in franchising contracts, which prohibited worker movement across locations within a chain. Implementing a staggered difference-indifferences research design using Burning Glass Technologies job vacancies and Glassdoor salary reports from numerous industries, we estimate a 6 percent increase in posted annual earnings from the job vacancy data and a 4 percent increase in worker-reported earnings.

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Year of publication:	9-6-2024
Authors:	Callaci, Brian ; Gibson, Matthew ; Pinto, Sérgio ; Steinbaum, Marshall ; Walsh, Matt
Publisher:	Kalamazoo, MI : W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research
Subject:	Employer market power \| oligopsony \| monopsony \| franchising chains \| antitrust \| wages \| salaries \| Franchising \| Marktmacht \| Market power \| Lohn \| Wages \| Monopson \| Monopsony \| Arbeitsmarkt \| Labour market