The effect of random shocks on reciprocal behavior in dynamic principal-agent settings
Year of publication: |
2023
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Authors: | Kerschbamer, Rudolf ; Oexl, Regine |
Published in: |
Experimental economics : a journal of the Economic Science Association. - Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, ISSN 1573-6938, ZDB-ID 2015444-6. - Vol. 26.2023, 2, p. 468-488
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Subject: | Gift exchange | Incomplete contracts | Laboratory experiments | Long-term contracts | Principal agent model | Random shocks | Reciprocity | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Experiment | Schock | Shock | Austauschtheorie | Social exchange theory | Unvollständiger Vertrag | Incomplete contract | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Vertrag | Contract | Spieltheorie | Game theory |
Description of contents: | Description [doi.org] |
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The effect of random shocks on reciprocal behavior in dynamic principal-agent settings
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The effect of random shocks on reciprocal behavior in dynamic principal-agent settings
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