The Effect of Review Mode and Reviewer Preference on Auditors’ Performance

This study examines the joint effect on auditor performance of two accountability features in the audit review process: review mode and reviewer preference. It investigates whether the auditors' strategic behavior can be mitigated under the e-mail review mode. Seventy-eight auditors participated in an experiment. Results suggest that, under the face-to-face review mode, auditors whose supervisors are known to be skeptical about client-provided explanations make lower likelihood assessment that the explanations can substantially account for the fluctuation of accounts receivable balance than auditors whose supervisors are known to trust the client-provided explanations. Such attitudinal shift is not reduced under the e-mail review mode. In addition, under the face-to-face review mode, auditors in the skeptical condition search for more opposing (less supporting) audit evidence than those in the credence condition. However, such differences diminish under the e-mail review mode. Our finding suggests that auditors' conformity to the reviewer preference can be moderated by review mode for process accountability but not outcome accountability