The effects of the take-option in dictator-game experiments: a comment on Engel’s (2011) meta-study

In this paper, we report a replication of Engel’s (Exp. Econ. 14(4):583–610, <CitationRef CitationID="CR10">2011</CitationRef>) meta-study of dictator game experiments. We find Engel’s meta-study of dictator game experiments to be robust, with one important exception: the coding of the take-option (List in J. Polit. Econ. 115(3):482–493, <CitationRef CitationID="CR15">2007</CitationRef>; Bardsley in Exp. Econ. 11(2):122–133, <CitationRef CitationID="CR1">2008</CitationRef>; Cappelen et al. in Econ. Lett. 118(2):280–283, <CitationRef CitationID="CR5">2013</CitationRef>). While Engel reports this as having no statistically significant effect, in our replications, we find an economically and statistically significant negative effect on giving in line with the relevant literature. Copyright Economic Science Association 2014