The efficiency of compensation contracting in China : do better CEOs get better paid?
Jack K. H. Fung, David Pecha
Year of publication: |
2019
|
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Authors: | Fung, Jack K. H. ; Pecha, David |
Published in: |
Review of quantitative finance and accounting. - New York, NY : Springer, ISSN 0924-865X, ZDB-ID 1087855-5. - Vol. 53.2019, 3, p. 749-772
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Subject: | Corporate governance | CEO ability | CEO compensation | China | Efficient contracting | Führungskräfte | Managers | Managervergütung | Executive compensation | Corporate Governance | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Lohn | Wages | Vergütungssystem | Compensation system | Leistungsentgelt | Performance pay | Unternehmenserfolg | Firm performance |
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