The efficient and fair approval of "multiple-cost-single-benefit" projects under unilateral information
Nava Kahana; Yosef Mealem; Shmuel Nitzan
| Year of publication: |
2009
|
|---|---|
| Authors: | Kahana, Nava ; Mealem, Yosef ; Nitsan, Shemuʾel |
| Published in: |
Journal of public economic theory. - Malden, Mass. : Wiley-Blackwell, ISSN 1097-3923, ZDB-ID 1468434-2. - Vol. 11.2009, 6, p. 947-960
|
| Subject: | Genehmigung | Permit | Investition | Investment | Projektbewertung | Project evaluation | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Mechanismus-Design-Theorie | Mechanism design | Theorie | Theory |
| Extent: | graph. Darst. |
|---|---|
| Type of publication: | Article |
| Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
| Language: | English |
| Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003909830