The efficient provision of public goods through non-distortionary tax contests

We use a simple balanced budget contest to collect taxes on a private good in order to ?nance a pure public good. We show that-with an appropriately chosen structure of winning probabilities-this contest can provide the public good efficiently and without distorting private consumption. We provide extensions to multiple public goods and private taxation sources, asymmetric preferences, and show the mechanism's robustness across these settings.

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Year of publication:	2011
Authors:	Giebe, Thomas ; Schweinzer, Paul
Publisher:	München : Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY)
Subject:	Öffentliche Güter \| Versorgung \| Spieltheorie \| Finanzierung \| Steuerwettbewerb \| Theorie \| Taxation \| Contests \| Efficiency

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Series:	SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper ; 352
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	10.5282/ubm/epub.13202 [DOI] 656139013 [GVK] hdl:10419/93944 [Handle] RePEc:trf:wpaper:352 [RePEc]
Classification:	C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory ; D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010333921