The equilibrium set of two-player games with complementarities is a sublattice

I prove that the equilibrium set in a two-player game with complementarities, and totally ordered strategy spaces, is a sublattice of the joint strategy space. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2003

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Year of publication:	2003
Authors:	Echenique, Federico
Published in:	Economic Theory. - Springer. - Vol. 22.2003, 4, p. 903-905
Publisher:	Springer
Subject:	Supermodular games \| Strategic complementarities \| Tarski's fixed point theorem \| Lattice

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Extent:	text/html
Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	C62 - Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium ; C72 - Noncooperative Games
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005753391