The equity core and the Lorenz-maximal allocations in the equal division core
Year of publication: |
2015
|
---|---|
Authors: | Llerena Garrés, Francesc ; Vilella, Cori |
Published in: |
Mathematical methods of operations research. - Berlin : Springer, ISSN 1432-2994, ZDB-ID 1310695-8. - Vol. 81.2015, 2, p. 235-244
|
Subject: | Cooperative game | Equity core | Equal division core | Lorenz domination | Kooperatives Spiel | Core | Transferierbarer Nutzen | Transferable utility | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Wohlfahrtsökonomik | Welfare economics |
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