The Evolution of Cooperation Through Institutional Incentives and Optional Participation
Year of publication: |
2014
|
---|---|
Authors: | Sasaki, Tatsuya |
Published in: |
Dynamic Games and Applications. - Springer. - Vol. 4.2014, 3, p. 345-362
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Publisher: |
Springer |
Subject: | Evolutionary game theory | Public good games | Social dilemmas | Rewards | Punishment | Equilibrium selection |
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