The false consensus effect disappears if representative information and monetary incentives are given
Year of publication: |
1999
|
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Authors: | Engelmann, Dirk ; Strobel, Martin |
Publisher: |
Berlin : Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes |
Series: | SFB 373 Discussion Paper ; 1999,66 |
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Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Type of publication (narrower categories): | Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Other identifiers: | 722393229 [GVK] hdl:10419/61729 [Handle] RePEc:zbw:sfb373:199966 [RePEc] |
Classification: | C91 - Laboratory, Individual Behavior ; D83 - Search, Learning, Information and Knowledge ; D84 - Expectations; Speculations |
Source: |
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