The first-order approach to the principal–agent problems under inequality aversion

Susumu Cao

Year of publication:	2013
Authors:	Cao, Susumu
Published in:	Operations research letters. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0167-6377, ZDB-ID 720735-9. - Vol. 41.2013, 5, p. 526-529
Subject:	Moral hazard \| Inequality aversion \| First-order approach \| Behavioral contract theory \| Moral Hazard \| Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie \| Agency theory \| Gerechtigkeit \| Justice \| Vertragstheorie \| Contract theory \| Leistungsanreiz \| Performance incentive

Check Google Scholar |

More access options

In libraries world-wide (WorldCat)

In German libraries (KVK)

Which error do you want to report?

Report: URL of this record is broken

Please note: Sometimes more than one URL is available for a resource. Please click on "More Options" to display these URLs

Report: Addition of an URL to that resource

Please note: Sometimes more than one URL is available for a resource. Please click on "More Options" to display these URLs

Report: The language(s) of that resource is/are…

Please note: Required language not in the list? Please use comment field

Report: Addition of an identifier to that resource

Report: report typo

Report: Add statement

Report: Add keywords

Please use the commentary box to describe other errors

Would you like to receive a feedback?

Commentary

Please type the code from the image

For general questions please use this address.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010191964

A service of the