The folk theorem in repeated games of incomplete information
Year of publication: |
1995
|
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Authors: | Cripps, Martin |
Other Persons: | Thomas, Jonathan P. (contributor) |
Institutions: | University of Warwick / Department of Economics (contributor) |
Publisher: |
Coventry : Dept. of Economics, Univ. of Warwick |
Subject: | Wiederholte Spiele | Repeated games | Unvollkommene Information | Incomplete information | Folk-Theorem | Folk theorem | Spieltheorie | Game theory |
Extent: | 43 S |
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Series: | Warwick economic research papers. - Coventry, ISSN 0083-7350, ZDB-ID 863068-9. - Vol. 439 |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Type of publication (narrower categories): | Arbeitspapier ; Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
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