The Impact of Managerial Flexibility on Negotiation Strategy and Bargaining Power

Using a dynamic real options approach we show that in a sequential bargaining framework managerial flexibility is strengthening the first-mover advantage by undermining the bargaining power of the second mover. Furthermore we compare the results of the sequential framework with the results of cooperative bargaining.

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Year of publication:	2011-04
Authors:	Lukas, Elmar ; Welling, Andreas
Institutions:	Fakultät für Wirtschaftswissenschaft, Otto-von-Guericke-Universität Magdeburg
Subject:	real option \| game theory \| sale \| negotiation \| flexibility \| ultimatum game

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	FEMM Working Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	Number 110008 17 pages
Classification:	G3 - Corporate Finance and Governance ; D81 - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008914250