The Influence of Information Externalities on the Value of Reputation Building - An Experiment

We observe that information externalities arise in sequential equilibrium of the chain store game such that the amount of reputation building among partners differs from that among strangers. No matching effects are predicted for the trust game. Our experiment confirms the qualitative chain store prediction, but information externalities also show up in the trust game.

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Year of publication:	2005-06-15
Authors:	Bolton, Gary E. ; Ockenfels, Axel
Institutions:	Staatswissenschaftliches Seminar, Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Fakultät

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Working Paper Series in Economics.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	Number 17
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005704384