The informativeness principle without the first-order approach

Pierre Chaigneau, Alex Edmans, Daniel Gottlieb

Year of publication:	2019
Authors:	Chaigneau, Pierre ; Edmans, Alex ; Gottlieb, Daniel
Published in:	Games and economic behavior. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0899-8256, ZDB-ID 1002944-8. - Vol. 113.2019, p. 743-755
Subject:	Contract theory \| Informativeness principle \| Principal-agent model \| Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie \| Agency theory \| Leistungsanreiz \| Performance incentive \| Moral Hazard \| Moral hazard \| Vertragstheorie \| Informationsökonomik \| Economics of information \| Informationswert \| Information value

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