The instability of matching with overconfident agents
Year of publication: |
2019
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Authors: | Pan, Siqi |
Published in: |
Games and economic behavior. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0899-8256, ZDB-ID 1002944-8. - Vol. 113.2019, p. 396-415
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Subject: | College admission | Gender | Overconfidence | School choice matching | Matching | Schulauswahl | School choice | Hochschule | Higher education institution | Theorie | Theory | Geschlecht | Studierende | Students | Vertrauen | Confidence | Qualifikation | Occupational qualification | Studium | University education | Agentenbasierte Modellierung | Agent-based modeling | Verhaltensökonomik | Behavioral economics |
Type of publication: | Article |
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Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal ; Konferenzbeitrag ; Conference paper |
Language: | English |
Other identifiers: | 10.1016/j.geb.2018.10.001 [DOI] |
Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
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