The inter-institutional distribution of power in EU codecision

This paper analyzes the a priori influence of the European Parliament (EP) and the Council of Ministers (CM) on legislation of the European Union adopted under its codecision procedure. In contrast to studies which use conventional power indices, both institutions are assumed to act strategically. Predicted bargaining outcomes of the crucial Conciliation stage of codecision are shown to be strongly biased towards the legislative status quo. Making symmetric preference assumptions for members of CM and EP, CM is on average much more conservative because of its internal qualified majority rule. This makes CM by an order of magnitude more influential than EP, in contrast to a seeming formal parity between the two ?co-legislators?.

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Year of publication:	2004
Authors:	Napel, Stefan ; Widgrén, Mika
Publisher:	Munich : Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute (CESifo)
Subject:	EU-Politik \| Politische Entscheidung \| Verhandlungsmacht \| Public Choice \| Verhandlungstheorie \| Theorie \| EU-Staaten \| power measurement \| European Union codecision procedure \| bargaining \| spatial voting \| decision procedures

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Series:	CESifo Working Paper ; 1347
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	477414281 [GVK] hdl:10419/18710 [Handle]
Classification:	D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legistures, and Voting Behavior ; C70 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory. General ; D70 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making. General ; C78 - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010261094