The Intermediate Community : A Behavioral/Bargaining Approach for Conflict Resolution at the Local - Bayesian Analysis

The paper explores the Nash’ equilibrium point and the “Non Cooperative Games Theory” for extension of bargaining solution analyses, applied in the local development field. Social trust and social cohesion conditions (sensitization process) within the Community develop the necessity of building social capital at a local level. That presupposes that the local community builds up a “new local standard,” based on local people’s sensitized instant reflection behaviour. By its turn, sensitized behaviour must be considered in the frame of any “bargain”, between two, taking place inside the Community. “Instrumental rationality” has been proved to be the main obstacle toward the socio-sensitized behaviour in the bargain process. Hence, a scientific dialogue in the socio-philosophical level has been developed on how “instrumental rationality” should co-exist with the “sensitized behaviour” at local levels leading to a “society of citizens.” Nash’ “bargaining solution” is based on binomial probabilities (p, 1-p) distribution, corresponding 1-1 with those utility functions “prices” (disagreement fear factor). In its extension, which may be the paper’s contribution in this academic dialogue, the author hypothesizes that the Intermediate Community (the “C” factor) produces a new behavioural type that converges the interests of both sides at a local level. By converting a binomial distribution (p, 1-p) into a trinomial distribution, (p1, p2, 1-p1-p2) combined with 3 utility function “prices”, the dynamic behavioural sensitization process may converge into the integrated local development limit – end. Thus, the resulted behaviour leads into the absolute cooperation, which steps on the same rules of globalization. The paper, then, argues that this resulted behaviour reflects the end point of the local development process