The joint benefits of observed and unobserved punishment: Comment to unobserved punishment supports cooperation

Laboratory experiments by Fudenberg and Pathak (2010), and Vyrastekova, Funaki and Takeuch (2008) show that punishment is able to sustain cooperation in groups even when it is observed only in the end of the interaction sequence. Our results demonstrate that the real power of unobserved punishment is unleashed when combined with observable punishment. Providing both unobserved and observed punishment strongly enhances cooperation within groups - strikingly, even with less intense sanctioning. This surprising result underlines the importance of the coexistence of observed and unobserved sanctioning mechanisms in social dilemmas.

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Year of publication:	2011
Authors:	Glöckner, Andreas ; Kube, Sebastian ; Nicklisch, Andreas
Publisher:	Bonn : Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
Subject:	Öffentliches Gut \| Nichtkooperatives Spiel \| Strafe \| Kooperation \| Gefangenendilemma \| Test \| Public Goods \| Unobserved Punishment \| Sanctioning Effectiveness

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Series:	Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods ; 2011,30
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	675903823 [GVK] hdl:10419/57483 [Handle]
Classification:	H41 - Public Goods ; C92 - Laboratory; Group Behavior ; H40 - Publicly Provided Goods. General
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010286696