The kappa -core and the kappa -balancedness of TU games

We consider transferable utility cooperative games with infinitely many players. In particular, we generalize the notions of core and balancedness, and also the Bondareva–Shapley Theorem for infinite TU games with and without restricted cooperation, to the cases where the core consists of \kappa κ -additive set functions. Our generalized Bondareva–Shapley Theorem extends previous results by Bondareva (Problemy Kibernetiki 10:119–139, 1963), Shapley (Naval Res Logist Q 14:453–460, 1967), Schmeidler (On balanced games with infinitely many players, The Hebrew University, Jerusalem, 1967), Faigle (Zeitschrift für Oper Res 33(6):405–422, 1989), Kannai (J Math Anal Appl 27:227–240, 1969; The core and balancedness, handbook of game theory with economic applications, North-Holland, 1992), Pintér (Linear Algebra Appl 434(3):688–693, 2011) and Bartl and Pintér (Oper Res Lett 51(2):153–158, 2023).