The Market Value of Family Values

is a description of the paper and not the actual abstract. This paper analyzes how transfers among family members affect the behavior of transfer recipients in the market and how market prices reflect the presence of non-market transfers. Parental and spousal transfers are motivated both by altruism and by a desire to use the transfers to impart specific values or behaviors to the recipient. When altruistic transfers predominate and the altruism is not completely reciprocated by the recipients, transfers aimed at insuring family members against market risk may have the unintended effect of increasing market risk for the beneficiaries, thus raising market transaction costs. The problem is mitigated when parents care directly about the actions of their children and design transfers to instill values. But government social schemes provide substitutes to family transfers that can reduce parental influence on children's activities and lead to bad market outcomes. Thus, government programs need to be redesigned to reinforce rather than usurp family values and parental influence over their children.