The MaxMin value of stochastic games with imperfect monitoring
Year of publication: |
2003
|
---|---|
Authors: | Rosenberg, Dinah ; Solan, Eilon ; Vieille, Nicolas |
Published in: |
International Journal of Game Theory. - Springer. - Vol. 32.2003, 1, p. 133-150
|
Publisher: |
Springer |
Subject: | Stochastic games | Imperfect monitoring | Maxmin value | Minmax value |
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