The Nash Solution as a von Neumann–Morgenstern Utility Function on Bargaining Games

In this paper we prove that the symmetric Nash solution is a risk neutral von Neumann–Morgenstern utility function on the class of pure bargaining games. Our result corrects an error in Roth (Econometrica 46:587–594, 983, 1978) and generalizes Roth’s result to bargaining games with arbitrary status quo.

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Year of publication:	2020
Authors:	Gerber, Anke
Published in:	Homo Oeconomicus. - Cham : Springer International Publishing, ISSN 2366-6161. - Vol. 37.2020, 1-2, p. 87-104
Publisher:	Cham : Springer International Publishing
Subject:	Bargaining games \| Nash solution \| Risk neutrality

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Type of publication:	Article
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Article
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	10.1007/s41412-020-00095-9 [DOI]
Classification:	A12 - Relation of Economics to Other Disciplines ; A30 - Multisubject Collective Works. General
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014503951