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The Nash-Threats Folk Theorem with Communication and Approximate Common Knowledge in Two Player Games

We show that the use of communications to coordinate equilibria generates a Nash-threats folk theorem in two-player games with “almost public†information. The results generalize to the <i>n</i>-person case. However, the two-person case is more difficult because it is not possible to sustain equilibria by comparing the reports of different players, and using these “third parties†to effectively enforce contracts.
Year of publication:
2007
Authors: Fudenberg, Drew ; Levine, David
Institutions: Department of Economics, Harvard University
Extent:
application/pdf
Series:
Type of publication: Book / Working Paper
Notes:
Published in Journal of Economic Theory
Source:
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010986609
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