The nested collective lottery that maximizes welfare under consumption interdependence

We develop a generalized lottery mechanism in this article that allows people to choose to succeed separately while retaining both merits (fairness and options to succeed jointly) of the collective lottery developed by Chen <italic>et al</italic>. (2010). We use the rationing of hunting permits in the US and Canada as examples to show the applicability of this generalized lottery mechanism.

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Year of publication:	2012
Authors:	Tseng, Wei-Chun ; Ngamsomsuke, Waraporn
Published in:	Applied Economics. - Taylor & Francis Journals, ISSN 0003-6846. - Vol. 44.2012, 14, p. 1863-1866
Publisher:	Taylor & Francis Journals

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Extent:	text/html
Type of publication:	Article
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010971393