The (non-)robustness of influential cheap talk equilibria when the sender’s preferences are state independent
Christoph Diehl, Christoph Kuzmics
| Year of publication: |
2021
|
|---|---|
| Authors: | Diehl, Christoph ; Kuzmics, Christoph |
| Published in: |
International journal of game theory. - Berlin : Springer, ISSN 1432-1270, ZDB-ID 1459207-1. - Vol. 50.2021, 4, p. 911-925
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| Subject: | Cheap talk | Communication | Information transmission | Robustness | Kommunikation | Informationsverbreitung | Information dissemination | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Nichtkooperatives Spiel | Noncooperative game |
freely available
| Type of publication: | Article |
|---|---|
| Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
| Language: | English |
| Other identifiers: | 10.1007/s00182-021-00774-0 [DOI] |
| Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012665410