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The Nonemptiness of the f-Core of a Game without Side Payments.

We prove the nonemptiness of the core of a continuum game without side payments where only small coalitions--ones bounded in absolute size of finite cardinality--are permitted. This result covers assignment games with a continuum of players and includes combinations of several assignment games, such as housing and automobile markets.
Year of publication:
1996
Authors: Kaneko, Mamoru ; Wooders, Myrna Holtz
Published in:
International Journal of Game Theory. - Springer. - Vol. 25.1996, 2, p. 245-58
Publisher: Springer
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Type of publication: Article
Source:
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005375662
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