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The number of pure Nash equilibria in a random game with nondecreasing best responses

We randomly draw a game from a distribution on the set of two-player games with a given size. We compute the distribution and the expectation of the number of pure-strategy Nash equilibria of the game conditional on the game having nondecreasing best-response functions. The conditional expected number of pure-strategy Nash equilibria becomes much larger than the unconditional expected number as the size of the game grows.
Year of publication:
2008
Authors: Takahashi, Satoru
Published in:
Games and Economic Behavior. - Elsevier, ISSN 0899-8256. - Vol. 63.2008, 1, p. 328-340
Publisher: Elsevier
Type of publication: Article
Source:
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005413506
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