The optimal financing of a conglomerate firm with hidden information and costly state verification

Rosa Ferrentino, Luca Vota

Year of publication:	2023
Authors:	Ferrentino, Rosa ; Vota, Luca
Subject:	Asymmetric information \| Conglomerate firm \| Contract theory \| Costly state verification \| Mathematical methods in economics \| Theory of corporate finance \| Asymmetrische Information \| Vertragstheorie \| Unternehmensfinanzierung \| Corporate finance \| Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie \| Agency theory \| Informationsökonomik \| Economics of information \| Konglomerat \| Conglomerate \| Fremdkapital \| Debt financing \| Kapitalkosten \| Cost of capital

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