The paradox of power : principal-agent problems and administrative capacity in imperial china (and other absolutist regimes)
Year of publication: |
2019
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Authors: | Ma, Debin ; Rubin, Jared |
Published in: |
Journal of comparative economics : the journal of the Association for Comparative Economic Studies. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0147-5967, ZDB-ID 715350-8. - Vol. 47.2019, 2, p. 277-294
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Subject: | Fiscal capacity | Absolutism | Administrative capacity | China | Credible commitment | Europe | Limited government | Monitoring | Principal-agent problem | Qing Empire | State capacity | Taxation | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Öffentliche Verwaltung | Public administration |
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The paradox of power : understanding fiscal capacity in imperial China and absolutist regimes
Ma, Debin, (2017)
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The paradox of power : understanding fiscal capacity in imperial China and absolutist regimes
Ma, Debin, (2017)
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The paradox of power : principal-agent problems and fiscal capacity in absolutist regimes
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The paradox of power : understanding fiscal capacity in imperial China and absolutist regimes
Ma, Debin, (2017)
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The paradox of power : understanding fiscal capacity in imperial China and absolutist regimes
Ma, Debin, (2017)
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The paradox of power : principal-agent problems and fiscal capacity in absolutist regimes
Ma, Debin, (2017)
- More ...