The performance measurement trap
Year of publication: |
2019
|
---|---|
Authors: | Kuksov, Dmitri ; Villas-Boas, J. Miguel |
Published in: |
Marketing science. - Catonsville, MD : INFORMS, ISSN 0732-2399, ZDB-ID 883054-X. - Vol. 38.2019, 1, p. 68-87
|
Subject: | game theory | contract design | principal-agent problem | sales force compensation | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Performance-Messung | Performance measurement | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory | Verkaufspersonal | Salespeople | Vertrag | Contract |
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