The Perverse Effects of Partial Labour Market Reform: fixed--Term Contracts in France
We argue that the effects of a partial reform of employment protection by allowing firms to hire workers on fixed--term contracts may be perverse. The main effect may be high turnover in entry--level jobs, leading to higher, not lower, unemployment. Even if unemployment falls, workers may be worse off, going through many spells of unemployment and entry--level jobs, before obtaining a regular job. Considering French data for young workers since the early 1980s, we conclude that the reforms have substantially increased turnover, without a substantial reduction in unemployment duration. If anything, the effect on their welfare appears to have been negative. Copyright 2002 Royal Economic Society
Year of publication: |
2002
|
---|---|
Authors: | Blanchard, O ; Landier, A |
Published in: |
Economic Journal. - Royal Economic Society - RES, ISSN 1468-0297. - Vol. 112.2002, 480, p. 214-214
|
Publisher: |
Royal Economic Society - RES |
Saved in:
freely available
Saved in favorites
Similar items by person
-
Blanchard, O, (1990)
-
Blanchard, O, (1991)
-
What We Know and Do Not Know about the Natural Rate of Unemployment.
Blanchard, O, (1996)
- More ...