edited by Charles K. Rowley, Robert D. Tollison, Gordon Tullock
I Perspectives -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Rent-Seeking Versus Directly Unproductive Profit-Seeking Activities -- 3 In Search of Rent-Seeking -- 4 Rents and Rent-Seeking -- II Theoretical Developments -- 5 The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation: A Game-Theoretic Analysis -- 6 Risk-Averse Rent Seekers and the Social Cost of Monopoly Power -- 7 Efficient Rent-Seeking Revisited -- 8 Long-Run Equilibrium and Total Expenditures in Rent-Seeking -- 9 Long-Run Equilibrium and Total Expenditures in Rent-Seeking: A Comment -- 10 Rent-Seeking Behavior in the Long-Run -- 11 Free Entry and Efficient Rent-Seeking -- 12 Back to the Bog -- 13 Life Among the Triangles and Trapezoids -- III Applications -- 14 Dispelling the Disinterest in Deregulation -- 15 Rent Extraction and Rent Creation in the Economic Theory of Regulation -- 16 Ideology, Interest Groups, and the Repeal of the Corn Laws -- 17 Rent-Seeking and Trade Protection -- 18 Voters as Investors: A Rent-Seeking Resolution of the Paradox of Voting -- 19 Committees and Rent-Seeking Effort -- 20 Government and its Bureaucracy: A Bilateral Bargaining Versus a Principal-Agent Approach -- 21 Demand-Revealing, Transfers, and Rent-Seeking -- 22 Competing for Aid -- 23 Managerial Rents and Outside Recruitment in the Coasian Firm -- 24 Optimal Taxation in a Rent-Seeking Environment -- 25 Rent-Seeking and Its Implications for Pollution Taxation -- 26 Privatizing the Commons: An Improvement? -- 27 Corporate Chartering: An Exploration in the Economics of Legal Change -- 28 Why Did the Industrial Revolution Occur in England? -- IV Toward Tomorrow -- 29 Agency, Economic Calculation, and Constitutional Construction -- 30 Rent-Seeking in Constitutional Perspective -- 31 Future Directions for Rent-Seeking Research. .
