The price of imperfect competition for a spanning network

A buyer procures a network to span a given set of nodes; each seller bids to supply certain edges, then the buyer purchases a minimal cost spanning tree. An efficient tree is constructed in any equilibrium of the Bertrand game.

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Year of publication:	2013
Authors:	Moulin, Hervé ; Velez, Rodrigo A.
Published in:	Games and Economic Behavior. - Elsevier, ISSN 0899-8256. - Vol. 81.2013, C, p. 11-26
Publisher:	Elsevier
Subject:	Algorithmic mechanism design \| Worst case scenario equilibrium analysis \| Frugality \| Minimum cost spanning tree problem \| Price of imperfect competition

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Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games ; C79 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory. Other ; D40 - Market Structure and Pricing. General ; D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection ; D44 - Auctions
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

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