The principal-agent model with multilateral externalities : an application to climate agreements
Carsten Helm; Franz Wirl
| Year of publication: |
2014
|
|---|---|
| Authors: | Helm, Carsten ; Wirl, Franz |
| Published in: |
Journal of environmental economics and management : JEEM ; the official journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0095-0696, ZDB-ID 188687-3. - Vol. 67.2014, 2, p. 141-154
|
| Subject: | Private information | Multilateral externalities | Mechanism design | Environmental agreements | Type-dependent outside options | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Umweltabkommen | International environmental agreement | Externer Effekt | Externalities | Mechanismus-Design-Theorie | Klimaschutz | Climate protection |
| Extent: | graph. Darst. |
|---|---|
| Type of publication: | Article |
| Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
| Language: | English |
| Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010373289