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The projection dynamic and the geometry of population games

The projection dynamic is an evolutionary dynamic for population games. It is derived from a model of individual choice in which agents abandon their current strategies at rates inversely proportional to the strategies' current levels of use. The dynamic admits a simple geometric definition, its rest points coincide with the Nash equilibria of the underlying game, and it converges globally to Nash equilibrium in potential games and in stable games.
Year of publication:
2008
Authors: Lahkar, Ratul ; Sandholm, William H.
Published in:
Games and Economic Behavior. - Elsevier, ISSN 0899-8256. - Vol. 64.2008, 2, p. 565-590
Publisher: Elsevier
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Type of publication: Article
Source:
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005409306
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