The regulation of hunting: A game population based tax on hunters

This paper examines a tax/subsidy on hunters based on game population. The tax/subsidy is the difference between actual and optimal population multiplied by an individual, variable tax rate. The tax rate is, among other things, based on the difference between the marginal value of the game population to the hunter and the regulator and differences in user costs of the population. The paper shows that the population tax/subsidy secures a first-best optimum.

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Year of publication:	2014
Authors:	Abildtrup, Jens ; Jensen, Franck
Published in:	Review of Agricultural and Environmental Studies - Revue d'Etudes en Agriculture et Environnement. - Département Sciences Sociales, Agriculture et Alimentation, Espace et Environnement (SAE2). - Vol. 95.2014, 3, p. 281-298
Publisher:	Département Sciences Sociales, Agriculture et Alimentation, Espace et Environnement (SAE2)
Subject:	Hunting \| population tax \| regulation \| forest \| externality

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Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	Q23 - Forestry ; Q28 - Government Policy ; D62 - Externalities
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010939245