The Replicator Dynamics Does not Lead to Correlated Equilibria

It is shown that, under the replicator dynamics, all strategies played in correlated equilibrium may be eliminated, so that only strategies with zero marginal probability in all correlated equilibria survive. This occurs in particular in a family of 4×4 games built by adding a strategy to a Rock-Paper-Scissors game.

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Year of publication:	2007-05
Authors:	Viossat, Yannick
Institutions:	Université Paris-Dauphine (Paris IX)
Subject:	Théorie des jeux

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Series:	Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	Published in Games and Economic Behavior, 2007, Vol. 59, no. 2. pp. 397-407.Length: 10 pages
Classification:	C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011074238