The role of domain restrictions in mechanism design : ex post incentive compatibility and Pareto efficiency

Salvador Barberà, Dolors Berga, Bernardo Moreno

Year of publication:	March 2018
Authors:	Barberà, Salvador ; Berga Colom, Dolors ; Moreno, Bernardo
Publisher:	Barcelona : GSE, Graduate School of Economics
Subject:	Mechanisms \| Interdependent Types \| Ex Post Incentive Compatibility \| Strategy Proofness \| Pareto Efficiency \| Preference Functions \| Jury Decisions \| Allocation Problems \| Auctions \| Pareto-Optimum \| Pareto efficiency \| Auktionstheorie \| Auction theory \| Neue politische Ökonomie \| Public choice \| Mechanismus-Design-Theorie \| Mechanism design \| Anreiz \| Incentives \| Allokation \| Allocation \| Spieltheorie \| Game theory \| Wohlfahrtsökonomik \| Welfare economics \| Soziale Wohlfahrtsfunktion \| Social welfare function