The role of dynamic renegotiation and asymmetric information in financial contracting
Year of publication: |
2015
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Authors: | Roberts, Michael R. |
Published in: |
Journal of financial economics. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0304-405X, ZDB-ID 187118-3. - Vol. 116.2015, 1, p. 61-81
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Subject: | Renegotiation | Financial contracts | Control rights | Asymmetric information | Asymmetrische Information | Verhandlungen | Negotiations | Fremdkapital | Debt financing | Vertrag | Contract | Kredit | Credit | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Kreditgeschäft | Bank lending | Verhandlungstheorie | Bargaining theory |
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