The role of private information in dynamic matching and bargaining: Can it be good for efficiency?

We consider a private information replica of the dynamic matching and bargaining model ofÂ Mortensen and Wright (2002). We find that private information typically deters entry. But, the welfare can actually be higher under private information.

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Year of publication:	2011
Authors:	Shneyerov, Artyom ; Wong, Adam Chi Leung
Published in:	Economics Letters. - Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1765. - Vol. 112.2011, 1, p. 128-131
Publisher:	Elsevier
Keywords:	Markets with search frictions Matching and bargaining Two-sided incomplete information

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Type of publication:	Article
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009146165