The role of transparency and voluntary disclosure on the control of directors’ compensation

Purpose This work provides an empirical analysis to determine whether directors’ compensation is lower (“transparency control effect” and “transparency deterrent effect”) or higher (“effects of transparency on increasing competition in pay”) among firms with greater transparency in terms of directors’ compensation. Methodology/approach A disclosure index about board compensation and different models based on linear panel-data regression have been developed, on a sample of 73 Spanish firms for the period 2007–2012. Findings Our results suggest that disclosure on pay strategy to directors leads to an increase in directors’ compensation, therefore, in this case, the effect of transparency on increasing competition in pay seems to prevail. Conversely, the disclosure on individual directors’ compensation and payment leads to a decrement in directors’ compensation, prevailing the transparency control effect and transparency deterrent effect. Social implications The results of this study might be of interest to investors (to take into account these effects before they implement additional corporate governance reforms) and regulators (to be aware of the importance of this issue). Originality/value First, we study the effect that transparency and voluntary disclosure regarding board compensation has on the level of directors’ compensation. Second, in this study we go one step further in the transparency of board compensation disclosures by constructing a disclosure index. Finally, the results contribute to the necessary debate that is currently taking place in the Spanish, European and international context regarding this issue.